

High Integrity Pressure Protection Systems (HIPPS) Technical brochure





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1. COMPANY PROFILE

AMPO is an international leader in highly engineered valves and Integrated Smart Solutions for the most severe applications and industries as well as in stainless steel and high alloy castings. Through our AMPO SERVICE team we guarantee a prompt response to customer needs wherever they are throughout the world: technical support in start-up stages, equipment selection, predictive and preventive maintenance, training, etc.





Innovative spirit



In more than 60 countries n

NAME OF TAXABLE

Most important partners in the industry

Cutting edge technologies

Customer Our commitment:

the best service





focus





2. APPLICATION

SAFETY INSTRUMENTED SYSTEMS (SIS)

Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) have been used for many years to perform Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) in the process industries. If instrumentation is to be effectively used for SIFs, it is essential that these instrumentations achieves certain minimum standards.



SAFETY INTEGRITY LEVEL (SIL) AND FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA) FOR HIPPS:

Safety integrity level (SIL) is defined as a relative level of risk-reduction associated with a specific hazard provided by a safety function or to specify a target level of risk reduction. In simple terms, SIL is a measurement of performance required for a SIF. In the IEC 61508 standard, four SILs are defined, with SIL 4 the most dependable and SIL 1 the least.

Safety Integrity Level (SIL)	Probability of Failure on Demand	Risk Reduction Factor	Safety Availability in %
4	>=10 ⁻⁵ to<10 ⁻⁴	100,000 to 10,000	99.99 to 99.999
3	>=10 ⁻⁴ to<10 ⁻³	10,000 to 1,000	99.9 to 99.99
2	>=10 ⁻³ to<10 ⁻²	1,000 to 100	99 to 99.9
1	>=10 ⁻² to<10 ⁻¹	100 to 10	90 to 99

For the end-user, there are several methods used to assign a SIL. Risk Matrix, Risk graphs and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) are techniques that are considered by the standard to determine the level of risk for protection by the SIS.

Hazards of a process system must be identified then analyzed through risk analysis. Mitigation of these risks continues until their overall contribution to the hazard are considered acceptable. The tolerable level of these risks is specified as a safety requirement in the form of a target 'probability of a dangerous failure' in a given period of time, stated as a discrete SIL. The supplier in turn, typically use Fault tree analysis (FTA) to justify the offered system to the required SIL. Any sufficiently complex system is subject to failure as a result of one or more subsystems failing. The likelihood of failure, however, can often be reduced through improved system design.

Fault tree is a top-down, deductive failure analysis which maps the relationship between faults, subsystems, and redundant safety design elements by creating a logic diagram of the overall system. A single fault tree is used to analyze one and only one undesired event, which may be subsequently fed into another fault tree as a basic event. The most severe conditions require the most extensive fault tree analysis.



High Integrity Pressure Protection System Fault Tree Anaysis

4.0E-03 1st Valve Failure									
4.0E-03 1st Actuator Failure	OR 8.0E-03		Roth 1st AND 2nd Final Fla	mont Egiluro	ailura 6 1E 05				
4.0E-03 2nd Valve Failure		AND	Doin TSI AIND ZIIG HINGI LIE		0.41-00				
4.0E-03 2nd Actuator Failure	OK 8.0E-03	I				OR Cor	nsidering CCF	3.0E-04	
2.4E-04 Common Cause Failure(8,3%	of 8.0E-03-								
1.0E-04 1st Solenoid Failure		1							
2.0E-05 1 st Pilot Valve Failure	OK 1.2L-04			1. (5.00)					
1.0E-04 2nd Solenoid Failure	OP 1 2E 04	AND	Both 1st AIND 2nd SOV+Pilo	t valve Failure	1.4E-08				
2.0E-05 2nd Pilot Valve Failure	OK 1.22-04					OR Cor	nsidering CCF	3.6E-06	
3.6E-06 Common Cause Failure(8,3%	of 1.2E-04								
4.0E-07 Logic Solver Failure									
5.0E-03 1 st Pressure Transmitter Failure	AND 2 5E 05	_							
5.0E-03 2nd Pressure Transmitter Failure	AIND 2.51-05	OR	Considering CCF	1.3E-04		OR Co	onsidering CCF	4.3E-04 -	
1.0E-04 Common Cause Failure(8,2%	of 5.0E-03								
5.0E-03 2nd Pressure Transmitter Failure		L							
5.0E-03 3rd Pressure Transmitter Failure	AIND Z.JE-UJ	OR	Considering CCF	1.3E-04	OR HIF	PS Failure	7.8E-04 0.0)007826	SIL 3
1.0E-04 Common Cause Failure(8,2%	of 5.0E-03								
5.0E-03 1st Pressure Transmitter Failure					0.100000	1.0E-01	to 0.010000	1.0E-02	SIL 1 SIL 2
5.0E-03 3rd Pressure Transmitter Failure	AIND Z.JE-UJ	OR	Considering CCF	1.3E-04	0.001000	1.0E-03	to 0.000100	1.0E-04	SIL 3
1.0E-04 Common Cause Failure(8,2%	of 5.0E-03				0.000100	1.0E-04	01000010	1.0E-05	SIL 4
5 0E-05 Common Cause Egilure(8 1%	of 5 0E-03					For cate	alogue purpo	ose only	

Some use both fault trees and event trees (Probabilistic Risk Assessment). An event tree starts from an undesired initiator (loss of critical supply, component failure etc.) and follows possible further system events through to a series of final consequences. As each new event is considered, a new node on the tree is added with a split of probabilities of taking either branch. The probabilities of a range of 'top events' arising from the initial event can then be seen.

HIPPS System Layout - Standard configuration



3. HIGH INTEGRITY PRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS (HIPPS)

HIPPS is a SIF applied to prevent over-pressurisation of a plant or pipeline by isolating and containing the source of the high pressure and protect the low-pressure line. It is the last line of defence in preventing loss of containment.



HIPPS is also known as;

HIPS = High Integrity Protection System

IPS = Instrumented Protection System

SSD = Safety Shutdown System

SIS = Safety Instrumented System

OPPS = Overpressure Protection System

It is a complete functional loop comprising three main elements: a final element (valve, actuator and the control panel) to isolate the pipeline, pressure sensors (initiators) to detect a pressure build-up and a controller to check the pressure signal is real rather than spurious, thus avoiding 'no cause' HIPPS activation and to activate isolation when there is a real demand. Typically for a SIL3 HIPPS, the system consists of two redundant final elements.



AMPO HIPPS can be found:

- 1. On offshore WHP, just after the tree before the spec. break.
- 2. At the on-shore receiving facilities.
- 3. On transmission pipelines at take up stations.

Licenses and Certifications:

- API 6A and API 6D
- SIL Certifications for Safety Shutdown Valves
- ISO 9001 : 2008
- CE ATEX
- PED (Pressure Equipment Directive)
- IEC 61511 Stage 4: Life Cycle Design and Engineering of Safety Instrumented Systems - Functional Safety Management



4. WHY CHOOSE OUR HIPPS SYSTEMS?

Wide experience on the design and manufacturing of **SAFETY RELATED VALVES** and a HIPPS system integrator.



Integrated **CUSTOMIZED** solutions. Certified in-House Functional Safety **ENGINEERS**.



SIL assessment certification and safety analysis reports. SIL

Fully Integrated Factory Acceptance Testing (IFAT) of the complete system.



Qualified service engineers to conduct a fully integrated SITE ACCEPTANCE TESTING (SAT) of the complete system anywhere in the world.

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5. TECHNICAL FEATURES

HIPPS SUB-SYSTEMS

1. INITIATOR

PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS

Pressure transmitters monitor the pipeline pressure against a pre-defined limit. The number and types of transmitters and their voting systems is a function of the overall SIL requirement. In a HIPPS, pressure transmitter are configured for 2003 voting for SIL 3 capable.



MECHANICAL INTERLOCKING MANIFOLD

The Mechanical Interlocking Manifold, or high integrity manifold block (HIMB) is certified by TüV in accordance with IEC 61508 and IEC 61511. In order to prevent operational errors, an interlocking manifold with a fool proof "sliding key" design, is part of the system. This "sliding key" principle will only permit closing and opening of isolating valves and vent valves in a pre-determined safe sequence. This will allow on-line calibration of instruments while preventing any faulty operation and consequently eliminating undesired (nuisance) shut-downs. Concurrently, the interlocking feature ensures that the desired SIL rating of an instrumented system is maintained. The manifold guarantees instrument availability because it will not allow more than one instrument to be isolated at the same time.



2. CONTROLLER

LOGIC SOLVER

The HIPPS logic solver captures signals from the pressure transmitters, and performs a 2003 voting logic, before activating the solenoids and closing the pipeline. Two types of TÜV certified logic solvers are available: programmable and solid state, both provide scalable redundancy. Communication to Process Control System available in OPC, Profibus DP and MODBUS.



The controller cabinets can be supplied suitable for hazardous area installation in EEx-d enclosure IP-66 or for safe area installation in standard 19" rack cabinet IP-42.

3. FINAL ELEMENT

Final elements are accorded the highest priority in a HIPPS loop as studies suggest that they account for 50% of safety loop failures historically and calculations suggest that their contribution to PFD avg. is the highest when compared with the initiators and controllers. Thus selection and design of valves and actuator is of paramount importance in a safety loop.

Selection of the final elements depends on reliability of the valve to close on demand, to closes within the design time and to maintain TSO leakage across the valves after shut down.

As Final Element, we offer Systematic Capability (SC) 3 Safety Related Ball Valve both Top Entry and Side Entry (2 piece or 3 piece) with SC3 Hydraulic or pneumatic quarter-turn spring return actuators with related controls to suit the requirement.



Our final element used in a SIS are "proven in use" accordance with IEC61511 and the system is classified as TYPE A in accordance with IEC61508. We have considered our most recent installed base which conservatively gives an operational year of 50,642. Upon request, a detailed reference list can be provided.

6. AMPO SERVICE

- Predictive and preventive maintenance
- Technical support
- Technical training
- Valve condition monitoring
- Spare parts and valve supply

On-site support within 72 hours. Experience in executing global maintenance service for complete projects.



7. WORLDWIDE SALES AND MANUFACTURING NETWORK





MANUFACTURING PLANTS:

AMPO HEADQUARTERS

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AMPO INDIA

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AMPO is just 1 hour drive away from BILBAO (International Airport) and at the following distances from other important places: 65 km west of Pamplona/45 km south of San Sebastian/70 km south of the French border.

